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Abstract. In the last 15 years, Italy has been involved in a complex, confuse and unfinished process 
of fiscal decentralization. In this context, data on fiscal flows are continuously produced and thrown 
in the political arena by several actors, political parties, interest groups and media alike, with little 
scientific underpinnings and often with limited adherence to reality. This paper discusses at length 
the issue of fiscal federalism in Italy and presents a careful attempt to measure regional 
redistribution, or fiscal flows across regions. It describes the decentralization process in Italy from 
the beginning of the ‘90’s to date and presents a few data on the main features of the Italian 
decentralization process, that only happened on the financing side, with little effects on the 
allocation of expenditure responsibility between levels of governments. The focus is however on the 
measurement of regional fiscal flows and on the problems concerning the regionalization of public 
expenditure and revenues. Our basic conclusions can be summarised as follows. Fiscal flows in 
Italy are huge and are mostly driven by the large difference in economic development between the 
different areas of the country. The public sector generally works in the direction of equalizing per 
capita (current) public expenditure across regions, at least for fundamental services. However, the 
distance in economic development, and therefore in tax revenues among regions, is so large that 
even this partial equalization is enough to generate consistent fiscal flows across the national 
territory. Clearly, fiscal federalism has some chances of success in Italy only if it works in the 
direction of reducing the distance between territorial areas and the Italian debate on fiscal 
federalism, rich in ideology and poor in facts, would certainly benefit by an improved quality of 
regional data and by official estimations, based on clear and transparent methodology, of regional 
fiscal flows.   
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Introduction  
 
In the Italian case, the issue of measuring regional redistribution, or fiscal flows across regions, has 
not only a scientific interest. In the last 15 years, the country has been involved in a complex, 
confuse and unfinished process of fiscal decentralization. A Constitutional reform, approved in the 
2001 and which should have consolidated the new financial and political relationships between 
governments, is still waiting to be applied. The sharp difference in the level of economic 
development across areas of the country, with the consequent high level of territorial redistribution, 
has been both one of main cause of the decentralization process, and the main obstacle for its 
conclusion. The worsening conditions of the economy, which has seen the rate of growth halving in 
the 2000’s with respect to the 90’s, and the consequent financial difficulties of the public sector, 
have contributed to exacerbate the distributional conflict between territories. Regional parties, 
playing the role of advocates for the respective territories, have seen an increasing political support, 
although they still collect only a minority of consensus. In this context, data on fiscal flows are 
continuously produced and thrown in the political arena by several actors, political parties, interest 
groups and media alike, with little scientific underpinnings and often with limited adherence to 
reality. The confusion in the debate is facilitated by the poor quality of official data concerning 
regional expenditure and revenue, possibly a result of the national tradition of strong centralization 
of the public sector. Only recently some progresses have been made, but we are still far from the 
transparency in regional fiscal data which would be requested for a functioning fiscal federal 
system.  
In this paper, we present a careful attempt to estimate regional fiscal flows, by considering different 
data sources and mixing them up coherently. For the difficulties of  building up a consistent data 
set, we consider only one year (2005) and only focus on current expenditure, disregarding capital 
one. For methodological reasons which are better detailed in the rest of the paper, we apply a 
benefit principle to the regional allocation of public expenditure, but we avoid to consider tax 
shifting phenomena across regions. We also disregard interest payments on public debt from our 
computations.  
Our results confirm the presence of strong financial flows from the rich regions of the North to the 
poor regions of the South. Through the public budget, a representative resident of the richest region, 
Lombardia, transfers about 30% of the total taxes and contribution she/he pays to the other regions, 
while a representative resident of the poorest region, Calabria, receives 55% in excess of what 
she/he pays. Per capita public expenditure for fundamental services (health, education) is 
approximately uniform across the territory, but there is a larger variance in the other local functions, 
where local tax revenue plays a much larger role. On the whole, total expenditure per capita turns 
out to be higher in the Northern regions. However, per capita tax revenue is much lower in the 
South of the country. This is almost entirely due to regional differences in income levels, as the tax 
system turns out to be approximately proportional to GDP. We also confirm the condition of 
absolute advantage of the Italian “special” regions, which enjoy a more favourable financing system 
than “ordinary” ones. We also attempt to isolate the different forces that shape the process. Social 
protection imbalance (mostly, in Italy, pensions for retired workers), for instance, plays an 
important role in determining the regional distribution of resources, in some cases working in the 
opposite direction of the fundamental North-South division line. We finally compare our results 
with previous attempts which have been made in Italy to estimate fiscal flows. It is comforting to 
note, considering the difference in methodology and data, that our results turn out to be broadly 
consistent with the existing literature. 
It would not be possible to understand and appreciate these results without some notions of the 
functioning of the system of local governments in Italy. To this aim,  we begin by presenting a brief 
introduction to the Italian local governments, their main functions and means of financing. We also 
provide a brief but up to date description of the decentralization process in Italy, from the beginning 
of the 90’s to the most recent events. We finally comment on the difficulties that the persistent   3
difference in income levels across regions create for the implementation of the existent Constitution 
and the role that detailed information on fiscal flows could have in better guiding the process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the decentralization process in 
Italy from the beginning of the ‘90’s to date, also introducing the reader to the mysteries of the new 
Italian Constitution. Section 2 offers more substance to this discussion, by presenting a few data on 
the main features of the Italian decentralization process. We show that it only happened on the 
financing side, with little effects on the allocation of expenditure responsibility between levels of 
governments. We also present some estimations on the likely effect of the implementation of the 
new Constitution on the devolution of resources to regions. Section 3 and 4 discuss our estimations 
of regional fiscal flows. We begin in section 3 by describing our data set, its limitation, and the 
methodology we follow in measuring fiscal flows. We then discuss separately our regionalization of 
public expenditure and revenues, commenting upon our findings. We finally compute our fiscal 
flows and disentangle them in their main components. Section 5 compares our findings with the 
previous literature. This section also contains a sample of the not academic computations of fiscal 
flows, which substantiated the political debate during the last political elections. Concluding 
remarks are offered in section 6.        
  
1.  The Italian path toward fiscal federalism  
 
In 1999, William Oates opened his famous essay on fiscal federalism by writing  “…and in Italy the 
movement toward decentralization has gone so far to encompass a serious proposal for the 
separation of the nation into two independent countries”.  The 1990s in Italy were no doubt a period 
of radical change in the financial relationships between levels of government. The process can be 
summarized by just two figures. In 1992, when the reform process got under way (in the wake of a 
severe financial crisis and on the road towards Maastricht) approximately only 15% of sub-national 
governments revenue came from own taxes; the rest from central government’s transfers, most of 
which were earmarked to particular items of expenditure. By 2000, own taxes of local governments 
accounted for almost 45% of sub-national total revenue, and almost all earmarked grants were 
transformed in block grants, with no strings attached to money. Besides, in 2001 the country 
changed its Constitution, in the direction of more decentralization, and in 2006 it attempted to 
change it again (but failed), when a national referendum rejected a constitutional amendment 
introducing even more decentralization. The story has not come to an end, however. Following the 
national elections of April 2008, a new centre-right coalition took power, and inside this coalition, 
the Northern League, a separatist  party of the North of Italy, almost doubled its share of votes. In 
the Northern League’s political agenda, fiscal federalism ranks first, and under its pressure, in 
October 2008 the new government approved a new framework law
1 aimed to further implement the 
2001 Constitution, by reinforcing fiscal autonomy of local governments and by revising the 
interregional redistribution mechanism.   
In the following, we will offer a brief survey of these processes, to the aim of helping the reader to 








                                                 
1 “Disegno di legge recante delega al governo in materia di federalismo fiscale in attuazione dell’articolo 119 della 
costituzione”.   4
  Some basic facts about levels of government in Italy 
 
In Italy there are three levels of sub-national governments
2, namely 20 Regions (Regioni), 107 
Provinces (Province)  and 8101 Municipalities (Comuni), with no hierarchical links between the 
different levels of sub-national government
3. Regions are divided in two groups, 15 “ordinary” and 
5 “special”, the two Islands and three small regions at the Northern border, one of which (Trentino 
Alto Adige) is in turn divided in two autonomous provinces (Provincia di Trento and Provincia di 
Bolzano). Special regions enjoy a particular status, more autonomy, and a different (and often more 
generous) financing system than ordinary regions. Special regions were introduced in the aftermath 
of the World War II in response to a threat of secession and as a result of international treaties 
aimed to defend linguistic minorities living in these regions. Italian regions differ to a large extent 
in terms of size, population, and economic development.  
 
 
Table 1 - Socio-economic indicators by region 
 
Population by age 














Piemonte 4330172  25.399  12,4 22,4 26,8 7,1  64,0
Valle d'Aosta  122868  3.263  13,2 20,2 31,8 6,8  66,3
Lombardia 9393092  23.861  13,6 19,4 31,6 3,7  65,5
Trentino Alto Adige  974613  13.607  16,1 17,7 30,4 5,1  67,1
Veneto 4699950  18.391  13,9 19,2 28,5 4,5  64,6
Friuli Venezia Giulia  1204718  7.855  12,0 22,6 27,0 7,2  63,1
Liguria 1592309  5.421  11,1 26,5 24,9 5,2  61,1
Emilia Romagna  4151369  22.124  12,5 22,7 29,9 2,5  68,4
Toscana 3598269  22.997  12,1 23,2 26,7 4,6  63,8
Umbria 858938  8.456  12,5 23,3 22,9 7,3  61,6
Marche 1518780  9.694  13,1 22,6 24,5 5,4  63,5
Lazio 5269972  17.207  13,9 19,1 29,3 6,8  58,4
Abruzzo 1299272  10.798  13,4 21,3 20,1 11,8  57,2
Molise 321953  4.438  13,4 22,0 17,8 21,5  51,1
Campania 5788986  13.595  17,5 15,3 15,8 27,0  44,1
Puglia 4068167  19.362  15,7 17,3 15,9 19,4  44,4
Basilicata 596546  9.992  14,5 19,9 16,9 24,5  49,3
Calabria 2009268  15.080  15,3 18,3 15,8 23,3  44,6
Sicilia 5013081  25.708  16,2 18,0 16,1 30,8  44,0
Sardegna 1650052  24.090  12,9 17,6 19,1 15,9  51,4
ITALIA 58462375  14,1 19,7 24,4 11,1  57,5
 
 
Table 1 presents some selected regional indicators for the year 2005. As we discuss below, the 
differences stressed in the Table 1 are useful to understand the Italian evolution towards fiscal 
federalism and to interpret our results in terms of regional fiscal flows. 
 
 
                                                 
2 In all the paper, with “sub-national governments” we mean Regions plus Provinces, plus Municipalities, with “general 
government” we mean the national government plus sub-national governments plus Social Security and with “central 
government” we mean only the national government.  
3 In 2009, three new provinces will be operative, so in Italy we will have 110 provinces.    5
1.2 The decentralization process of the 90’s 
 
Over the last three decades, Italy has gradually implemented a process of fiscal decentralization and 
reformed fiscal relations among levels of government. Table 2 summarizes the main institutional 
changes underpinning this path toward fiscal federalism. 
 
 
Table 2 - Main steps to fiscal decentralization 
 
1948  - Constitution foresees the creation of regions; special powers are granted to five 
special statute regions. 
1972-77  - “Ordinary statute” regions are set up. The tax reform of the early 1970s heavily 
centralizes revenue against the significant decentralization of expenditure. 
1978  - Health expenditure is decentralized to regions. 
1992  - Health contributions and automobile taxes are attributed to regions. 
- Attribution of ICI (a local tax on property) to municipalities 
1993  - Electoral reform: the mayor and the president of provinces are elected directly by 
citizens. 
1995  - Specific state transfers are abolished and replaced by a share of the excise on 
gasoline 
-  A new equalization fund is set up. 
1997  - A new tax on productive activities (IRAP) is introduced and assigned to regions 
and its yield more than replaces the abolished health social contributions.  
1998  - A surcharge on the personal income tax (IRPEF), by 0.5 percentage points, is 
introduced (offsetting an equal reduction in the national IRPEF) for regions and 
municipalities.  
1997-98  - Bassanini Laws: more administrative powers are attributed to local governments 
1999  - A Reform having constitutional status granted the Regions’ freedom to decide 
their own form of government and regional statutes.  
2000  - Legislative decree 56 replaces central transfers with tax revenue sharing (the most 





The Italian Constitution of 1948 foresaw the creation of ordinary regions. However, differently 
from special regions, which were introduced immediately after the war, ordinary regions were set 
up only 20 years later, in 1970, when for the first time regional elections took place. During the 
1970s and 1980s, following the 1948 Constitution, most functions related to health care were 
attributed to the ordinary statute regions, together with agriculture, industry and local 
transportations. Financing was granted by a number of earmarked transfers and tax shares. 
Municipalities traditionally enjoyed more tax autonomy than regions. However, in 1973-74, a 
massive tax reform strongly centralized revenues, so that taxing power was taken away from 
municipalities and substituted by a system of grants from the national government. The system 
proved to be unstable, however. Sub-national government’s spending resulted systematically and 
significantly exceeding their own revenues; the deficit was covered ex post by the central 
government, and endemic problems of soft budget constraint emerged in the Italian 
intergovernmental system (see Bordignon, 2000;  Bordignon and Turati 2005)  Following the 
turmoil of the beginning of the 90’s (characterized by a severe financial and political crisis), a 
number of reforms were implemented with the aim to harden the local budget constraints and to 
improve accountability and responsibility of local governments. These reforms affected both the 
expenditure  – through further decentralization of some functions to sub-national governments – 
and in particular,  the financing side – through the assignment of new local taxes to regions and 
municipalities (see Table 2). As we document below, this marked a strong shift from “centrally   6
derived” financing, with all resources provided via earmarked transfers by the Centre, to more 
“autonomous” financing with block grants, some regional sharing of central government taxes (such 
as the VAT) and own taxes. 
Reforms, however, did not only occur on the financing side. In an attempt to further improve the 
accountability of local politicians, electoral reforms were introduced both at the municipal (1993) 
and at regional level (1999), roughly moving the local electoral rules from the traditional pure 
proportional-parliamentary system to a presidential-majoritarian one (direct election of Mayors and 
Presidents of regions). This strengthened the political importance and the powers of Mayors of big 
cities and of regional Presidents, who were elected for the first time under the new system in the 
spring of 2000. These new political leaders started to call for more reforms and more devolution of 
powers, especially in the north, where the Northern League gained consensus. Under this new 
political scenario, the National Parliament began a discussion to introduce amendments on the 
articles of the 1948 Constitution relating to the distribution of powers and resources between levels 
of government. In spring 2001, the Parliament approved a constitutional reform which modified a 
number of  articles (from 114 to 133) concerning the powers of sub-national governments and their 
financial relationships with the central government. The reform was approved by popular 
referendum in October 2001.  
 
1.3 The 2001 constitutional reform  
 
A detailed discussion of the overall implications of the new Constitution would go far beyond our 
aims here (see Giarda, 2004). However, key elements are the attribution of new legislative powers 
and competences to regions in a large subset of functions. Furthermore, the new Constitution also 
allows for “asymmetric federalism” (according to a detailed political procedural, a Region can ask 
for extra powers) and makes the plea that as far as possible, power of executions should be 
transferred to municipalities and provinces (whereas formerly this power was strictly connected to 
the legislative power).  
But the key innovation of the new Constitution is art. 119, that describes the new fiscal relations 
among the different levels of government. First, it establishes that the regions ought to be financed 
totally with revenue of their own and tax shares, allowing them to introduce new taxes, and ruling 
out transfers by the central government as standard practice of financing. Secondly, it introduces an 
interregional redistribution fund whose sole purpose is to reduce the differences in the fiscal 
capacity of different regions (in the form of unconditional grants), with no reference to difference in 
regional needs or current regional expenditure.  
This article has proved to be too revolutionary to be implemented so far. Several attempts and also 
several amendments to the Constitution which were proposed during the 2000’s failed or were 
rejected by referendum (see Table 3). In spite of the new Constitution, regions and other local 
governments keep to be financed as they were already in the ‘90’s, and several functions that the 
Constitution assigns to regions are in fact still under the strict control of the central government. 
This contradiction between the Constitution and ordinary legislation creates a situation of 
continuous uncertainty for private economic agents (e.g. it is never clear who has the right to pass 
legislation on a number of issues), and has generated an ongoing conflict between the regions and 
the central government (the constitutional conflict before the Italian Constitutional Court increased  
by 500% after the reform).  
While it is clear that this situation cannot go on indefinitely, it is also clear why it has proved so 
difficult so far to implement the new Constitution. First, there is a distributional conflict between 
areas of the country. As we document below, the distance between the rich regions of the North and 
the poor regions of the South is simply too large to allow for a literal implementation of the new 
financing systems. It would imply, at least in the short run, a sharp reduction in the level of public 
expenditure in the South and a sharp increase in territorial inequality. Second, the deteriorating   7
economic situation of the 2000’s and the need for the more productive North to regain the ability to 
compete at the international level has made this conflict even more acute, invigorating separatist 
movements in the North. Third, the ongoing difficulties of public finance (with a debt/GDP ratio 
that is still above 100%) have made the central government, in spite of the Constitution, unwilling 
to give up resources and functions to periphery, fearing that this may result in a loss of control and a 




Table 3 - Further proposals to amend the Constitution 
 
2002  - DDL 26 february 2002: change in art. 117, devolution in health, education, local police service  
2003  - Law 5 june 2003, “legge la Loggia” 
2003  - 11 april 2003 “Disegno di legge costituzionale” other changes in art. 117 and suppression of  asymmetric 
federalism  
2003  - AS 2544  “Bozza di Lorenzago” proposal of changing 35 articles of the Constitution  
2006  - Constitutional Law, 18 November 2006 n.268 voted by the Parliament. This law was changing almost 40% of 




1.4 The current situation and future developments 
 
In the meantime, with the formation of the new government, the legislative process for 
implementing the new Constitution has started again. A proposal approved by the regional council 
of Lombardia in 2007 and written in the political programme of the main party of the coalition 
which won the 2008 political elections, Partito delle Libertà, (paradoxically, a party mostly voted 
in the South of the country) was eventually abandoned by the same party as being too “radical” , as 
it would have implied leaving too many tax resources to  regions, and in particular to the Northern 
ones. As already mentioned, a more “moderate” project has been finally approved by the central 
government in October 2008 and it is going to be implemented in the next two years by 
government’s decrees. The project is more moderate in the sense of allowing for more regional 
redistribution than the former, as the proposal recognizes that the redistribution system must 
guarantee the “full financing of the essential levels of fundamental services” (such as Health and 
Education) in all the national territory, disregarding art.119 on this respect. But the meaning of this 
proposition in terms of regional redistribution has been (on purpose?) left unclear, and we will have 
to see if this project (and the government coalition which proposed it) survives when it will be made 
precise in the future implementation phase.        
 
 
2.  The data: revenues and expenditures by levels of government 
 
  Some data on decentralization in the 90’s 
 
But what did exactly happen in the 90’s in terms of devolution of functions and resources to local 
governments? And what would the new Constitution imply in terms of  further devolution to local 
levels of government? This section briefly answer these queries by presenting a few data. 
First, we look at expenditure. Table 4 presents a decomposition of total public expenditure 
(including interest payments) by levels of governments and by function in two selected years, 1990 
(at the beginning of decentralization process) and 2006 (the last year available).  
   8
 
Table 4 - Public expenditure by levels of government and by functions (% of the total 
expenditure of the general government ) in 1990 and 2006  
 
Source: ISTAT; expenditures include also expenditure for interests on debt and it is included in general public service 
carried out by central government. Sub-national governments here include regions, provinces, municipalities plus other 
small local public entities endowed of  their own budget (public universities, chamber of Commerce etc.).  
 
 
Table 4 speaks for itself. In the given time interval, there has been a sharp reduction in the amount 
of expenditure attributed to the central government (which now accounts for only 35% of total 
expenditure, while it spent almost 50% in 1990), a moderate increase in the share of expenditure 
intermediated by local governments (from 27 to 31%), and a sharp increase in the share dedicated to 
social protection (from 24 to 34%). But looking more carefully at the single functions, we see that 
there is very scant evidence of decentralization on the expenditure side
4. The sharp reduction in 
central government share was largely due to the fall of nominal interest rates granted by the 
admittance to the EMU (interest payments fell by almost 7 points of GDP in the period, from 12% 
to 5%), while the increase in social protection is the result of a quickly ageing population (20% of 
Italian population has now more than 65 years of age) and of a very generous pension system (see 
the next section). In terms of functions, the distribution of expenditure between the central and local 
level of government appears remarkably stable in the period (social security funds only finance 
social protection). The next graph also suggests that in percentage of GDP, public expenditure (net 
of interests) by the two levels of government has remained largely stable in the period, and all the 
increase in general government expenditure can be attributed to raising social protection outlays.        
                                                 
4 Notice that expenditure by level of government is a very imprecise way to measure decentralization, as it does not say 
much on the level of autonomy of local governments in determining their own expenditure. For the reasons spelled out 
in the previous section, on these grounds, there was more decentralization on the expenditure side that the number in 
Table 4 suggests.  







General public services   86,75% 13,25% 0,00% 
Defence 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Public order and safety  88,12% 11,88% 0,00% 
Economic Affaire  61,15% 38,85% 0,00% 
Environment protection  13,30% 86,70% 0,00% 
Housing and community amenities  17,37% 70,45% 12,18% 
Health 1,95% 97,66% 0,38% 
Recreation, Culture and Religion  29,56% 70,44% 0,00% 
Education 77,19% 22,81% 0,00% 
Social protection   16,92% 3,78% 79,30% 
Total 48,85% 26,76% 24,39% 







General public services   73,7% 26,3% 0,0% 
Defence 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Public order and safety  87,2% 12,8% 0,0% 
Economic Affaire  61,8% 38,2% 0,0% 
Environment protection  15,3% 84,7% 0,0% 
Housing and community amenities  9,4% 90,8% -0,2% 
Health 1,4% 98,5% 0,1% 
Recreation, Culture and Religion  35,0% 65,0% 0,0% 
Education 72,7% 27,3% 0,0% 
Social protection   1,9% 3,6% 94,4% 
Total 35,1% 30,8% 34,1%   9
Graph 1 - Current  public expenditure by levels of government (in % of GDP,  years: 1980-




As anticipated, the evidence for decentralization is instead much more robust on the financing side. 
Graph 2, which plots the evolution of the share of tax revenue on total revenue of sub-national 
governments, shows a sharp increase of local governments’ “fiscal autonomy” along the period. 
This ratio increased from just about 7% in 1980 to over 45% in 2006. Splitting this figure for the 
two main levels of local governments (regions and municipalities), we see that this implied a sharp 
reduction in grant financing and a corresponding sharp increase in tax financing (see Graphs 3 and 
4). Regions in particularly moved from being financed by tax revenue for only about 15% in 1990 
to over 50% of their budget. Of course, these numbers have to be taken with care as they mix up 
own taxes (where local governments can at least vary the rates) with local shares of central taxes 
(where autonomy is none). But the main jumps in the pictures do coincide with the introduction of 
two main own taxes for local governments; the property tax for Municipalities (ICI,1993) and a tax 
on value added raised at the firm’s level (IRAP, 1998) for Regions.   
 
Graph 2 - Fiscal autonomy of local governments 



































1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Cental Government Sub-National Government Social Security Funds
Central Government
Sub-National Government
Social Security Funds  10
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2.2 Implementing the new Constitution 
 
A related question is how much more decentralization is implicit in the 2001 Constitution, since, as 
we argued above, most of it is still waiting to be implemented. To be sure, nobody knows the exact 
answer, as there is still a lot of debate going on between lawyers and constitutional experts on the 
exact meaning of the Constitution, on whether for instance the devolution of legislative powers in a 
given function to regions also implies a corresponding devolution of resources, and to what extent.  
But there are a few estimations, a sample of which is offered in the tables below. ISAE (a Treasury 
institution for economic research) for instance, estimated in 2003 that a full implementation of the 
Constitution in the same year would have meant devolving to regions about 70 billions euro (5% of 
GDP), a figure similar to the one estimated by other studies (Bordignon and Cerniglia 2004). Notice 
that according to these estimations, education is the main function to be devolved to regions 
(expenditure in education is nowadays only 27,3% of total expenditure for sub-national 
governments, see table 4)
5, plus some other functions related to social protection and to the 
management of the territory. 5% of GDP is quite a large number, but it should be noticed that it is 
                                                 
5 Education is indeed the main function to be devolved explicitly mentioned in the 2008 framework law on 
decentralization.   11
not entirely out of mark in an international context (after the devolution, Italy would become 
slightly more decentralized than, say, Spain).  
But the catch is in the interregional distribution of this expenditure. As the next table makes it clear, 
by presenting the same data on a per capita basis, this central expenditure to be devolved to regions 
is unevenly distributed on the territory.  
In the Southern regions, it is on per capita basis 50% higher than in the Northern ones. This is not 
surprising, as the functions to be devolved are strongly labor intensive, and it is well known that 
there are relatively more public employees in the South than in the North (according to ISTAT, 
2002, for instance, there are 39 national public employees over 1,000 inhabitants in the South and 
26 in the North). In turn, this distribution of public employment reflects both efficiency 
considerations and pure waste. For example, Southern regions are still slightly younger than 
Northern ones, (see Table 1)  (although the difference is fading fast) and it is therefore obvious that 
there may be a need of more teachers in the South than in the North. On the other hand, this 
“difference in social needs” is hardly enough to explain the huge observed difference in the 
distribution of public employment. Mostly, this has to do with lack of private labor market 
opportunities, which has pushed public administrations  in the South to hire more workers as a sort 
of (inefficient) unemployment benefits, and with uniformity of public salaries on the national 
territory, in face of sharp differences in the cost of living
6, which has triggered a large mobility of 
public employees from the North to the South (e.g. Southern workers entering in the Public 
Administration of the North and then exploiting seniority and generous labor conditions to go back 
home).  
Be this as it may, the result is however a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Constitution.   
As Table 5 shows, for instance, if all this devolved expenditure were to be financed entirely out of 
local resources, the rich Northern regions would only need a devolution of tax resources equal to 
about 4% of their GDP, while a figure almost three times higher (around 10% of regional GDP) 
would be needed in the poorer Southern regions. And indeed, it is easy to show that some of poorest 
regions of the South would be unable to finance their total expenditure (current plus devolved) even 
with a full devolution of all national and local taxes raised in their territory. Of course, as we 
document in the next section, the simple fact that these functions are currently financed implies that 
there are already huge transfers going through the central public budget from the North to South. 
 
 
Table 5 - Implementing the new Constitution: 










  Source: ISAE, 2003 
 
 
And, as we recalled above, the Constitution does predict the maintenance of interregional 
redistribution. But, of course, on political grounds, it is not the same to redistribute funds trough the 
central public budget to finance national functions, and to redistribute the same sums across 
territories to finance regional ones. And if this interregional redistribution fund had the 
                                                 
6 According to ISTAT, 2007, for instance, the cost of  living in Milan is about 30% higher than in, say, Palermo. 
New expenditure after devolution  Regions 
  Millions euro  Euro per 
capita 
% of regional 
GDP 
Centre- North  37.991  1.087  4,2 
South 20.478  1.461  9,4 
Total Ordinary regions  58.469  1.194  5,2 
Total Special regions  10.584  1.185  6,3 
All regions  69.053  1.193  5,3 
Centre- North  39.584  1.063  4,1 
South 29.469  1.426  9,1   12
characteristics envisaged by the Constitution (see above), maintaining the same flows of resources 




3.  Towards the computation of net fiscal flows in Italy 
 
  3.1 Methodology problems and lack of reliable data 
 
Despite the fact that fiscal federalism has been on the fore of the public debate for more than 15 
years, one serious problem in discussing regional distribution of public funds in Italy is due to the 
poor quality of available data. This does not mean that attempts have not already been made to 
compute “fiscal flows” across Italian regions; on the contrary, as we will illustrate in section 5, 
these computations abound, are continuously discussed in the local or national press, and therefore 
certainly inform the public debate. But the quality of these exercises is poor, and they are mostly 
produced in order to be cast in the political arena, rather than as serious attempts to understand 
causes and effects of interregional redistribution. A few academic exercises have also been 
produced in the past but, affected as they are by lack of data, they too can only be considered as 
very rough approximations of the existing situation. We comment on them in section 5.  
Notice that there may be (or may have been) some very good reasons behind this poor quality of 
local data. Traditionally, Italy has always been a very centralized country, and it was therefore 
never felt the need to compute precise numbers on local taxes and expenditure, as well as on the 
localization of central public expenditure, which is largely determined by personal (e.g. across 
individuals) rather than territorial (e.g. across level of governments) redistribution. Possibly, this 
lack of transparency might also have been functional to support on political grounds the huge 
amount of interregional redistribution which is carried on by the public sector (see Bordignon and 
Minelli, 2001).  It is only in the most recent years that the main statistical Italian bodies
7, pressed by 
the on going decentralization process, have started producing data on the regionalization of (some 
items of ) public expenditure and revenues.  
A very promising start in this direction is represented by the CPT (Conti Pubblici Territoriali) 
database, a project supported by the Department of Development Politics (a Treasury department), 
which has attempted to provide information (for the 20 Italian regions) about revenues and 
expenditure levied in each region by each level of government (Central Government, Regional 
Governments and other local governments). Besides, expenditure for any level of governments is 
presented according to both a functional and an economic classification, and budgetary data are 
consolidated, by eliminating intergovernmental financial flows (such as transfers among different 
levels of government). One limitation is that  CPT data are cash flow data (which may be a problem 
for some applications) and cover only the period since 1996 up to the year 2006. But in spite of 
these limitations, it is clear that if the CPT data set were entirely reliable, the task of producing 
analysis on interregional redistribution in Italy would have been enormously facilitated. 
Unfortunately, our close scrutiny of the CPT data and a detailed comparison with data deriving 
from other sources has shown the existence of severe pitfalls, so severe that they did not allow us to 
use the CPT directly in the exercises which follow.  
The main source of distortion seems to derive from the fact that CPT use the accounts of the 
Regions themselves in determining the revenue and expenditure classification. Regional accounts 
are notoriously unreliable, because of the Regions’ habit, permitted by an excessively vague 
accounting legislature, to classify differently the different items of expenditure and revenue
8. 
                                                 
7 In particular, the Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (the main administrative staff of the Treasury), ISTAT, (the national 
institute of statistics) and more recently, the Bank of Italy. 
8 For instance, a Region might classify the regional tax sharing on VAT as a transfer or a tax revenue, and regional main 
expenditure, health care, (mainly, transfers to the regional health units) is often hidden in different parts of the budget.   13
Besides, CPT researchers seem to have had considerable problems in decentralizing, for some 
particular year, tax revenue and expenditure, excessively expanding compensatory labels - such as 
poste correttive e compensative di entrate o spese - to the effect of making comparisons across time 
periods difficult even inside the same CPT data set. Finally, the estimated levels of total (general 
government) public expenditures and revenues in the CPT conflict with other sources of data (for 
example, the amount of total revenues is larger than it results from General Government 
accounting), probably because tax revenues have been computed gross and not net of tax refunds.  
Faced with these difficulties, our own choice has been to try to build a more reliable picture of the 
Italian situation by making reference to several data sources (mainly, ISTAT and budgetary data 
form Treasury) at the same time, mixing them up accordingly, and using CPT data only when was 
no possible to do otherwise. The exercise involves some amount of educated guess and 
discretionary choice, but it is probably the best it can be done in Italy given the present quality of 
data. We will provide a detailed description of the steps we made when presenting our own results 
in the sections to follow. One unfortunate consequence of this state of affairs is that as the process 
of building up a reliable data set at regional level is slow and painful, we were able to produce data 
for one year only, the 2005, the most recent year where a complete set of data is available. This 
does not allow us to make comparisons across time periods, as would have been in principle 
desirable. In future work, we plan to extend our computations to another year at least.  
 
 
  3.2 Net fiscal flows 
 
As is well known, there is no universally accepted way to compute fiscal flows (see for instance 
Ruggeri 2008).  The choice depends on what one wishes to measure, (e.g. the localization of 
expenditure or its benefits to population), the public sector aggregate one chooses to consider 
(General Government or some broader notions including for instance, service production by public 
firms), the time period, and so on. In our case, we decided to compute net fiscal flows as the 
difference between what the residents of a region pay and what they get from the General 
Government (central + local + social security), making reference to a benefit notion for public 
expenditure
9 (see below). Concerning data, we only consider current revenues and current 
expenditures. So, among revenues, we include direct and indirect taxes, social security contributions 
and revenues from sales of some public services; we do not include transfers from European Union 
and capital revenues. On the expenditure side, we do not include capital payments and transfers to 
the European Union; we also do not include interest payments on public debt. There are a number 
of justifications for our choices.   
First, we decided not to consider transfers from the EU (mostly for agriculture and capital 
investments) because they are not resources coming from internal sources, and therefore they do not 
involve a flow of funds from the residents of a region to the residents of another. As we do not 
consider transfers from the EU, we also do not to consider outlays to the EU. Second, capital 
expenditure (approximately, about 9% of total expenditure) has been excluded because it presents a 
large component of cyclicality (and so it may distort the results relative to the particular year we 
consider), it is affected by special events (e.g. natural calamities) and it is in part financed by funds 
from the European Union, especially in the Southern regions. We comment below of the likely 
                                                 
9 We did not, however, consider hypotheses of tax incidence across regions in determining the regional burden of 
taxation (issues of tax incidence inside a region are of course irrelevant in our context, because our exercise implicitly 
assumes the existence of a representative consumer in each region). We could have done some tentative computations, 
as Italian regions differ in both external trade and technological specialization, and especially for corporate taxation and 
VAT,  issues of tax incidence are likely to be relevant. But upon reflection, we felt that our empirical knowledge of  tax 
incidence is too shaky to allow us sensible corrections of data on this front, and therefore preferred  to avoid the issue 
altogether.    14
effect of re-introducing capital expenditure in our computations (see also the discussion in section 
5).  
Third, we also decided to eliminate interest payments on public debt from the analysis (a large 
component of current public expenditure in Italy, about 10% of general government expenditure, 
because of the large size of public debt) for a number of reasons. First, because it is unclear the 
localization of these payments (half of the holders of the Italian public debt are not Italian 
residents), although the CPT use banks’ regional deposits to approximate the regional distribution 
of the remaining half (concluding that most of this expenditure is located in the richer North). But, 
mostly, because interest payments raise some subtle dynamic issue which is difficult to address 
convincingly. Current interest payments are in fact the results of the funding of some past 
expenditure; and in an analysis of the distributional effects of the public sector on the territory, one 
would also wish to consider which regions were benefited by this original expenditure. But this is 
extremely difficult, at least in the Italian context. Should we consider the primary deficits of the 
Southern regions which was responsible for the initial accumulation of the debt in the 70’s? Or 
should we rather consider the self accumulation of debt in the 80’s – triggered by high and positive 
real interest rates - which certainly benefited more the Northern regions where most Italian public 
debt holders were located? As is impossible to answer these questions convincingly, we prefer to 
simplify the matter by eliminating interest payments altogether.  
As for the localization of expenditure, we use a benefit approach. That is, in considering items of 
public expenditure whose benefits clearly go beyond the residents of one region, we ignore the 
localization of this expenditure and simply assume that the money is spent proportionally to the 
population in each region. This means in particular redistributing across the territory the 
administrative expenditure for general public services (mostly concentrated in Lazio, where Rome, 
the Capital, is located), defence (mostly concentrated in the smaller regions at the borders and in the 
two main islands), and public order and safety (which also presents a larger concentration in the 
Southern regions, where organized crime is still rampant). For items of public expenditure that 
instead have a clear localization of benefits, such as Education, Health, local services, transfers to 
the private sector etc., we use the localization of expenditure as a measure of the benefits accruing 
to local residents.  
Finally, we isolate Social Protection (mostly, public pensions payments), whose regional 
localization of both payers and percipients is known, from the other sources of public expenditure, 
because both the origin and the functioning of this source of expenditure is different from the 
others. By and large, in the Italian context, this is a form of “forced saving”, where the current 
working population pays a large amount of its gross income (about 34% for dependent workers) to 
current pensioners in exchange of a “promise” to receive this money back once this population 
reaches the old age. As the current Italian pension system is actuarially unfair (pensions are above 
the capitalized contributions paid), the age composition and the working career of the population 
across regions is different, and the deficit of the Social Security system is financed by tax revenue, 
the Social Protection system involves in fact a huge amount of redistribution, both across regions 
and across generations. Notice also that Social Protection system also finances “social pensions” 
(minimum outlays for people who did not work or did not accumulate enough contributions to 
finance a full pension) and “inability pensions” (pensions for people with handicaps), although their 
amount is much smaller than the pensions for retired workers. Finally note that because of the 
peculiar characteristics of the Italian welfare system, there are very little transfers in favour of the 
younger generation (no minimum social wage for example, and unemployed benefits cover only a 
small part of the population), and most of the other items of social expenditure (e.g. social housing, 
nurseries, etc.) are a direct responsibility of local governments, and are therefore directly computed 
in the local expenditure. 
A final limitation of the Italian data is that we do not have specific information about tax 
expenditures (reduction in tax payments for households or firms in specific conditions) which are   15
mandated by the Central government. Again, they tend to be mostly concentrated in the South and 
so they  also affect the computation of the fiscal flows.                 
Finally note that since we eliminate interest payments and capital expenditure from our 
computations, we end up with a slight surplus in the current (net of interest) public budget, in 
coherence with the results of general government accounting (while the deficit of the General 
government in Italy in 2005 was 60 billions euro or 4,2% of GDP). In our computations, total 
current revenues overcome total current public expenditure by 43 billions euro and to simplify the 
exposition, when computing fiscal flows, we eliminate this surplus (subtracting it on a per capita 
basis from total revenue), by just assuming that it goes to finance the expenditure we do not 
consider in our computations. As a result, the net fiscal flows measure exactly the excess of 
expenditure over tax payments in any specific regions.   
In presenting our computations, we prefer to discuss separately first the localization of expenditure, 




3.3 Regional distribution of expenditures 
 
We start our analysis by decomposing total current public expenditure (central and local 
expenditure) – net of interests on public debt -  in a few main functions, as follows:  
 
1.  national public goods (central government spending for defence, public order and safety, 
and general public services); 
2.  social services (health, education); 
3.  social protection; 
4.  all other functions (local pure public goods, economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, recreation, culture and religion).  
 
Each of these expenditures has then been regionalized on the basis of different sources of data and 
according to different methods. The expenditures for national pure public goods (according to the 
data provided by ISTAT, the National Statistics Institute) have been attributed to the different 
regions on a per capita basis, whereas the expenditure for local pure public goods is what results 
from regional, provincial and municipal balance sheets (according to CPT data). As far as health 
and education expenditure is concerned, we use data from the Minister of Health and the Minister 
of Education, which provide a regional distribution of expenditure. For social protection, we use 
another database (Central Government Regional Expenditure, Spesa Statale Regionalizzata), which 
provides social protection spending in each region. Finally, for the remaining functions, we use 
CPT data, meticulously corrected to account of some particular item, such as poste correttive e 
compensative delle entrate and oneri non ripartibili
10. 
Graph 5 shows the average composition of public expenditure. Social protection represents the main 
component, about 47% of total expenditure, followed by health and education, which absorb 25%, 






                                                 
10 Poste correttive e compensative delle entrate should be expenditure items to be compensated by corresponding 
revenue items (for example, tax rebates), but often it is unclear which kind of expenditures it is included under this 
label.  Oneri non ripartibili should be expenditure items difficult to share out among the different functions, but 
sometimes they also include interests on public debt.   16
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Table 6 -  Regional distribution of public expenditures 
















Puglia 1160 2199 3474 1201 8033 
Campania 1160 2447 3062 1415 8084 
Calabria 1160 2298 3386 1503 8347 
Basilicata 1160 2342 3436 1551 8489 
Sicilia 1160 2434 3354 1694 8641 
Veneto 1160 2256 4209 1167 8791 
Abruzzo 1160 2511 4100 1375 9146 
Molise 1160 2683 3729 1664 9235 
Lombardia 1160 2229 4819 1236 9444 
ITALIA 1160 2400 4432 1496 9488 
Marche 1160 2316 4595 1432 9502 
Sardegna 1160 2399 3944 2123 9626 
Piemonte 1160 2303 5239 1524 10226 
Emilia Romagna  1160 2407 5307 1382 10256 
Toscana 1160 2447 5143 1526 10276 
Umbria 1160 2488 5164 1791 10602 
Lazio 1160 2797 5113 1727 10796 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  1160 2457 5518 1930 11065 
Liguria 1160 2490 6239 1703 11592 
Trentino Alto Adige  1160 2991 4775 2877 11803 
Valle d'Aosta  1160 2888 5449 4587 14083 
Mean 1160 2362 4331 1722 9502 
Standard deviation  0 216 904 754 1495 
Coefficient of variation  0 0,09 0,21 0,44 0,16 
* It include local pure public goods, economic affairs, environmental protection,  
housing and community amenities, recreation, culture and religion  
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As we said, the (current) expenditure for national pure public goods has been attributed to each 
region on a per capita basis and it amounts to 1160 euro; the expenditure for health and education 
amounts on average to 2400 euro per capita and  ranges between 2199 euro in Puglia and 2991 in 
Trentino Alto Adige; social protection, 4432 euro on average, varies between 3062 euro per capita 
in Campania and 6239 in Liguria; finally, the expenditure for all other functions amounts on 
average to 1496 euro per capita, with a minimum of 1201 euro in Puglia and a maximum of 4587 
euro in Valle d’Aosta. As for the total per capita expenditure, the minimum level is in Puglia (8033 
euro) and the maximum in Valle d’Aosta (14083 euro). Most of the regions in the South of Italy 
receive an amount of public spending under average; on the contrary, in four special statute regions 
(Sardegna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta), which are benefited by 
an overly generous financing system, public expenditure is well above the average. 
More precisely, the regional distribution of expenditure for health and education is more uniform 
than social protection and other functions, as shown by the low coefficient of variation (0,09). 
These are items largely mandated by the Central government (as discussed above, education is 
mostly a national function, while on health care, regions have a higher autonomy) so they are 
provided uniformly on the national territory, depending on the characteristics of the population. 
Besides, the higher expenditure for health in some regions (the Northern regions) is partially 
compensated by the higher expenditure for education in the other regions (the Southern regions, 
which are younger (Table 6). 
Much more variability is observed for social protection expenditure (the coefficient of variation is 
equal to 0,21). This is due to the different structure of population by age and by working conditions. 
Liguria is the region with the highest per capita social protection expenditure and it also is the 
region with the highest rate of ageing; all the Southern regions show a social protection expenditure 
under average and this fact reflects both the lower rate of employment and the higher incidence of 
irregular labour in these regions (recall Table 1). A much more relevant variability concerns the 
other functions (coefficient of variation equal to 0,44), where regional and local governments have 
more autonomy and which are more affected by the availability of local resources. Notice however 
that this large variability is mostly due to the special regions, which are clearly outliers in term of 
expenditure; ordinary regions present a much lower variability. 
 
 
3.4 Regional distribution of revenues 
 
The analysis of regional distribution of general government revenues was more complicated than 
that of the regional distribution of expenditures. As explained above, we have been forced to use 
different sources of data and different methods to assign revenues to different regions. We 
considered all central government taxes, local taxes, social contributions and revenues from sales of 
some public services. As far as central government taxes are concerned, we regionalized personal 
income tax, corporation income tax, value added tax, interest dividend and capital gains taxes, oil 
and gas taxes, cigarettes taxes and other excises, registration mortgage and cadastral taxes
11. We 
based our analysis on data from Minister of Finance and ISTAT. As for local taxes, we considered 
IRAP (a regional tax on productive activities), ICI (a municipal property tax), regional and 
municipal income tax surcharges and other minor local taxes. For IRAP, ICI and regional and 
municipal income tax surcharges, we used a database provided by Minister of finance, that already 
                                                 
11 In regionalizing national taxes we basically follow the methodology already used in our sources. According to this 
methodology, a national tax is attributed to the region where the economic transaction which creates the tax burden 
takes place. Thus, for instance, residence  of the taxpayer is used to regionalize the personal income tax, the location of 
production (already legally used to share IRAP revenue across regions) is used to regionalize the corporation income 
tax (IRPEG) as well, final consumption is used for VAT revenues, and so on. Gasoline tax, tobacco tax, games and 
other local taxes are attributed according to regional consumption of the same items. As already said, we ignore entirely 
tax incidence issues.   18
regionalizes tax revenues; for all other local taxes and revenues, we directly collected data from 
regional, provincial and municipal balance sheets (provided by ISTAT). Finally, for social 
contributions, we used the CPT database, which however seems reliable on these grounds.   
Table 7 shows the regional distributions of total current revenues, net of per capita current surplus 
(see next section).  
 
 
Table 7- Regional distribution of public revenues 

















Calabria 5531 4299 1738
Campania 5773 4488 1816
Puglia 5977 4734 1815
Sicilia 5979 4840 1675
Basilicata 6175 4645 2081
Molise 6725 5001 2215
Sardegna 7264 5547 2228
Abruzzo 7753 5870 2405
Umbria 8817 6581 2732
Marche 9356 6800 3046
ITALIA 9488 6952 3036
Liguria 10206 7889 2805
Toscana 10436 7626 3270
Veneto 10627 7635 3503
Piemonte 10695 7795 3391
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  11278 8181 3573
Lazio 11534 8237 3792
Emilia-Romagna 12006 8666 3813
Trentino Alto Adige  12191 8954 3600
Lombardia 13097 9255 4320
Valle d'Aosta  13194 10274 3358
Mean 9231 6866 2859
Standard deviation  2633 1832 814
Coefficient of variation  0,29 0,27 0,28
 
 
The per capita average is 9488 euro and varies between the 5531 euro in Calabria and about 13000 
euro in Lombardia and Valle d’Aosta (see also Graph 6). Between the richest and poorest region, 
the difference in per capita revenue is therefore about 250%. More generally, all Southern regions 
exhibit per capita revenues under average and all the Center-North ones per capita revenues above 
average, a fact which fits well with the regional income distribution of Table 1. The picture does not 
change much if we use different components of total revenues, such as tax revenues or social 
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Graph 6 - Total current revenues, net of current surplus 
























in % of 
GDP 
Piemonte 29,1 23,7 5,3
Valle d'Aosta  32,3 22,5 9,8
Lombardia 29,3 24,0 5,3
Trentino Alto Adige  29,4 22,2 7,3
Veneto 26,8 21,8 5,0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 30,3 24,0 6,3
Liguria 31,7 25,6 6,0
Emilia-Romagna 29,0 23,7 5,2
Toscana 28,6 23,3 5,3
Umbria 28,8 23,4 5,3
Marche 27,8 22,2 5,6
Lazio 28,1 22,7 5,3
Abruzzo 29,2 23,5 5,7
Molise 28,2 22,9 5,3
Campania 28,3 23,1 5,3
Puglia 29,7 24,3 5,4
Basilicata 27,6 22,4 5,1
Calabria 27,3 22,4 4,8
Sicilia 30,0 23,0 7,0
Sardegna 29,1 23,3 5,8
ITALIA 28,5 23,3 5,1
 
 
Table 8, that computes regional tax revenues in percentage of regional GDP, suggests that the 
national tax system as a whole is approximately proportional to GDP; the effective tax rate is almost 
constant across regions, and it is only slightly higher in the richest (Lombardia: 24%) with respect 
to the poorest region (Calabria, 22,4%). Special regions seem to tax slightly more their taxpayers 
that ordinary regions, but this figure should be taken with care. The special financing system of 
these regions may somewhat also affect the distribution of national tax revenue, which in theory is 
computed on the basis of uniform criteria across regions. A slightly higher variation we observe in 
local taxation (where regions and other local governments have some amount in discretion), but   20
once again, once we take special regions out of the picture, we see that the difference is limited, 
ranging form 4,8% to GDP in Calabria to 6% in Liguria (that had to raise local taxation in order to 
finance a particularly high health expenditure). The next table (Table 9) suggests that this must be 
due to consumption taxes and other taxes working regressively, as the main Italian tax, the personal 
income tax, is strongly progressive, with the average tax rate (on a tax base which is approximately 
60% of the Italian GDP) being almost six points higher in Lombardia (19,8%) than in Calabria 
(14,2%). 
 
Table 9 - IRPEF tax base, revenue and average tax rate, 2005 
  Irpef tax base  Net revenue  Average tax rate 
Piemonte 59.968.558 11.014.760 18,4 
Valle d'Aosta  1.818.425 336.119 18,5 
Lombardia 142.408.577 28.242.389 19,8 
Liguria 22.271.907 4.096.825 18,4 
Trentino Alto Adige  14.114.829 2.598.838 18,4 
Veneto 62.582.951 11.145.864 17,8 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  17.029.576 3.042.264 17,9 
Emilia Romagna  62.108.918 11.462.334 18,5 
Toscana 47.795.874 8.521.879 17,8 
Umbria 10.310.904 1.719.189 16,7 
Marche 18.278.587 2.973.907 16,3 
Lazio 71.501.115 14.128.779 19,8 
Abruzzo 13.412.747 2.103.184 15,7 
Molise 2.951.253 437.091 14,8 
Campania 44.870.944 7.006.346 15,6 
Puglia 34.084.323 5.050.696 14,8 
Basilicata 5.032.102 711.172 14,1 
Calabria 15.261.555 2.160.907 14,2 
Sicilia 40.204.464 6.183.627 15,4 
Sardegna 15.594.221 2.476.210 15,9 




4.  Net fiscal flows: our computation 
 
As we noticed already, current revenues exceed the items of general government current 
expenditures we consider in this work. This is unsurprisingly, and indeed the figure we obtain it is 
entirely consistent with the current surplus net of interest which is exhibited by the General 
Government consolidated accounting. But as our purpose here is to capture the distributive effect of 
the public sector across regional territories, we prefer to eliminate this surplus on a per capita basis, 
subtracting it from tax revenue, so as to have a zero net fiscal flow on average. Subtracting total 
current revenues (net of current surplus) from total regional expenditure, we finally get the net fiscal 
flows presented in Table 10 below (see also graph 7).  
Not surprisingly, since as shown above, current expenditure is much more uniformly distributed 
than total revenue, all Southern regions turn out to be net recipients, while Northern regions are net 
payers. To exemplify: through the public budget, each resident of Lombardia transfers about 3,600 
of euro of the taxes and contributions she/he pays (or around 30% of the total taxes and contribution 
she/he pays) to the other regions. On the contrary, each resident of Calabria receives through the 
public budget 2,800 euro from the other Regions, or about 55% more resources than the total taxes 
and contributions she/he pays. To a lesser extent, this is also true for any resident of the North 
versus any resident in the South. The only exceptions are Liguria (a smaller region with a 
disproportional share of elderly population, see Table 1) and Valle d’Aosta (a very small special 
region with an extraordinary amount of current expenditure), two Northern regions that also appear   21
to be net recipient of funds. Trentino and Friuli (two other small special rich regions of the North) 
turn out to be net payers, although it should be recalled that we are not considering here capital 
expenditure, which is well known to be particularly high in these two regions (and in the Southern 
regions). Probably, if we had considered capital expenditure as well, the general picture would not 
have changed much, with the only difference that the distance between net payers and net recipients 
would have become even more pronounced and some regions (the two special regions mentioned 
above) would have moved from the net payers to the net recipients category. Our comparisons with 
other studies which instead also consider capital expenditure confirms this intuition (see section 5). 
Notice that size also plays a role; possibly because of unexploited returns to scale in the provision 
of services, smaller regions are consistently higher spenders than larger regions.  
 
 
Table 10 -  Net fiscal flows 
(per capita, euro) 












Valle d'Aosta  -890
Marche -146
ITALIA   0
Toscana 160
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  212








An interesting question to raise is what causes this redistribution of resources across the territory, if 
this is due to a deliberate effort by the centre to equalize the provision of essential services (such as 
Health or Education) or as if the result of the working of some “automatic”  mechanism, such as the 
social security system. To address this issue, we compute a measure of regional social protection 
“imbalance”  by subtracting social protection expenditure  from social contributions by region. 
The result is shown in Graph 8. Notice that as the social protection system is in disequilibrium 
(current payments overcome current revenues and the difference is paid out of tax revenue), all 
regions now appear to be  net receivers from the system. But of course this imbalance now depends 
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Thus, the region more benefited by the social security redistribution system turns out to be Liguria, 
the oldest Italian region, and many other Northern regions (Toscana, for example, another relatively 
old region) also appear among the regions that benefit most from the redistribution system implicit 
in the social security mechanism. However, age (e.g. retirement pensions) is clearly not the only 
explanatory factor, as many Southern regions too, in spite of being relatively “younger” than the 
others, also appear among the ones most benefited by the system. Clearly, income support 
mechanisms (e.g. social pensions and minimum pensions) also play a role in leading the regional 
redistribution.   As a final exercise, we then compute fiscal flows net of the social protection   23
system, that is, subtracting contributions payments from total tax revenues and social security 
outlays from total expenditure, and computing the difference between the two residuals.  
 






















Central   Local  
Calabria -2817 -1648 2059 -3228 
Sicilia -2662 -1679 2277 -3260 
Molise -2510 -1514 2682 -3679 
Sardegna -2361 -1716 3076 -3721 
Basilicata -2313 -1355 2370 -3328 
Campania -2311 -1245 2223 -3289 
Puglia -2056 -1659 2431 -2828 
Umbria -1785 -2432 4088 -3442 
Abruzzo -1394 -1695 3425 -3124 
Liguria -1386 -3434 5180 -3132 
Valle d'Aosta  -890 -2090 6120 -4920 
Marche -146 -1548 4299 -2897 
ITALIA 0 -1475 4666 -3191 
Toscana 160 -1873 5061 -3028 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  212 -1945 5394 -3237 
Trentino Alto Adige  388 -1175 5746 -4183 
Piemonte 469 -1849 5225 -2908 
Lazio 737 -1321 5693 -3635 
Emilia-Romagna 1750 -1494 6068 -2824 
Veneto 1836 -706 5128 -2586 
Lombardia 3653 -499 6696 -2544 
 
 
Results are shown in Graph 9 which suggests that by eliminating social security the fiscal flows are 
somewhat diminished in size, and that the security system on average works against the 
fundamental redistribution flows from the North to the South of the country. Regions such as 
Calabria and Campania are now closer to the national average (with 1,000 euro of “excess”   24
revenue) than in the computation considering all revenue and all expenditure. On the other hand, 
regions like Lombardia and Veneto, which in addition of being richer, are also relatively younger 
than the others, turn out to be more penalized in this case. Table 11, which disentangles further 
fiscal flows in its three basic elements, social security, central and local, confirms this intuition
12.      
 
 
5. Comparison with previous literature 
 
As we said already, we are certainly not the first to compute interregional fiscal flows in the Italian 
context. On the contrary, computations abound, although their average quality may be questioned. 
Among serious academic research, we list in the tables below the previous studies we were able to 
find. These studies differ in terms of the reference year, the data used, and the purpose of the 
exercise. For instance, Arachi et al (2006) use CPT data, only excluding interest payments on public 
debt (and therefore considering capital expenditure as well), a mixed criteria for regionalizing 
public expenditure (benefit approach and cash flow approach), and instead of a year the average for 
the years 1996-2002. They also get a surplus for Italy of 811 euro per capita, which they do not 
correct in their computations of fiscal flows. Brosio and Revelli (2003) in an older study, use a cash 
flow principle (expenditure is allocated on the basis of the location of the actual disbursement), also 
regionalize interest payments, and, lacking further information, use approximation methods to 
regionalize tax revenue, considering tax shifting hypotheses as well. They also do not correct for the 
overall deficit. Finally, Maggi and Piperno (1998), in an even older study, use the benefit principle, 
include interest payments as well but on a per capita basis at the national level, and consider tax 
shifting hypotheses in regionalizing tax revenue.  
In spite of all these differences, the results do not end up to be very different from ours, thus 
pointing out to some underlying robustness in the basic phenomenon all these works intend to 
measure. A simple correlation analysis shows that the closest estimate to ours is that of Arachi et al. 
(2006), (correlation index, 0.93) possibly because it is the most recent work and use (partly) the 
same data. The most far is the study of Brosio and Revelli (2003), with a correlation coefficient of 
0.47, probably because they do not use a benefit principle but a cash flow one to regionalize public 
expenditure. In terms of a ranking of the different regions, from the most benefited to the more 
harmed by regional redistribution, results are also not too different from ours. In all studies, 
Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia Romagna turn out to be the highest net payers, while in three studies 
over four, Calabria turns out to be the region most benefited by redistribution. Interestingly, while 
in our case two special regions of the north (Trentino and Friuli) turns out to be net payers, in all the 
other studies ,these regions are instead net benefited by interregional redistribution, and in the work 
of Brosio and Revelli (2003), all special regions turn out to benefit more than Calabria. The most 
plausible explanation is that all these different studies also consider capital expenditure (which we 
instead exclude), which is well known to be particular high in all special regions (and in the South), 
and in the case of Brosio and Revelli they also use a cash flow principle, so for instance, attributing 
defence expenditure where is spent (mostly in the three special regions and in Sardegna) and 
administrative expenditure to Lazio (which in fact turns out to benefit from redistribution). On the 
whole, therefore, all these studies provide support to our basic computations and the main 




                                                 
12 In Table 11, national net fiscal flows are computed as difference between central government revenues and the 
expenditure for national pure public goods; local net fiscal flows are computed as difference between local governments 
revenues and the expenditure which benefit in a different measure the residents in different regions (health, education 
and all other functions). 
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Piemonte 469 2.083 950 1255 
Valle d'Aosta  -890 -3.301 -2568 -2633 
Lombardia 3653 4735 1426 2788 
Trentino Alto Adige  388 -614 -2648 -2288 
Veneto 1836 2731 2070 1673 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  212 715 -1488 -154 
Liguria -1386 -232 23 -305 
Emilia-Romagna 1751 3064 1252 1802 
Toscana 160 1028 1124 694 
Umbria -1785 -772 54 -696 
Marche -146 518 799 249 
Lazio 737 2219 -1467 226 
Abruzzo -1394 -763 95 -769 
Molise -2510 -2492 -407 -1996 
Campania -2311 -1911 -233 -1276 
Puglia -2056 -1688 -177 -1074 
Basilicata -2313 -2954 -1237 -2205 
Calabria -2817 -3487 -844 -2736 
Sicilia -2661 -2841 -1050 -1967 
Sardegna -2361 -2615 -1748 -2123 
ITALIA 0 811 197 193 
Correlation 




But, as we said above, academics are not the only ones to produce data on fiscal flows in Italy. 
Political parties and interest groups are also continuously producing numbers, which are thrown in 
the political debate to support specific positions and particular requests. For instance, Table 14 
presents a selected sample of the numbers on fiscal flows which appeared in the media during the 
last electoral campaign. Obviously, in most cases,  neither the data source nor the criteria behind 
these numbers were specified. A quick look at the data is enough to understand how poor the 
political debate has been.  For instance, according to the Northern League,  Lombardia has a net 
positive fiscal flows of 5380 euro per capita whereas Campania has  -133 and Basilicata -1232. The 
other estimations also do not make much more sense. But as we said already, an excuse for these 
poor numbers lies in the lack of transparency on regional data in Italy. The political debate would 
certainly benefit by a improved quality of data and by official estimations, based on clear and 
transparent methodology, of regional fiscal flows.     26
Table 13  – Ranking of regions 
Net fiscal flows in increasing order 


















C a l a b r i a  1181  
Sicilia  2477  
M o l i s e  3696  
S a r d e g n a  4535  
B a s i l i c a t a  5364  
Campania 6 7 10 8 
Puglia 7 8 11 9 
Umbria 8 9 13 11 
A b r u z z o  91 01 41 0  
Liguria 10 12 12 12 
V a l l e  d ' A o s t a   1 1222  
Marche 12 13 15 15 
Toscana 13 15 17 16 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  14 14 4 13 
Trentino Alto Adige  15 11 1 3 
Piemonte 16 16 16 17 
Lazio 17 17 5 14 
Emilia-Romagna 18 19 18 19 
Veneto 19 18 20 18 
Lombardia 20 20 19 20 
 
 















Piemonte 469  n.a. 316 1372 18
Valle d'Aosta  -890  n.a. -4.767 - 4363  -6.094
Lombardia 3653  5380 3.292 3971 2.121
Trentino Alto Adige  388  n.a. -2.208 n.a.  n.a.
Veneto 1836  n.a. 2.513 3267 2.061
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  212  n.a. -2.615 - 574  -2.611
Liguria -1386  n.a. -2.285 - 530  -2.307
Emilia-Romagna 1751  n.a. 2.643 3625 2.020
Toscana 160  n.a. 180 1351 -145
Umbria -1785  n.a. -2.379 - 598  -2.323
Marche -146  n.a. 120 1432 190
Lazio 737  n.a. -1.430 682 -1.419
Abruzzo -1394  n.a. -1.155 - 872  -2.356
Molise -2510  n.a. -2.232 - 2121  -3.281
Campania -2311  -133 -2.013 - 1137  -2.121
Puglia -2056  n.a. -2.204 - 1404  -2.267
Basilicata -2313  -1232 -3.060 - 2322  -3.583
Calabria -2817  -570 -3.473 - 2607  -3.881
Sicilia -2661  n.a. -2.854 - 2648  -3.922
Sardegna -2361  n.a. -3.186 - 1415  -3.160
ITALIA 0  n.a. -266 777 -715
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6. Concluding comments 
 
In this paper we discussed at length the issue of fiscal federalism in Italy and presented a few results 
in terms of computing fiscal flows across regions. Our basic conclusions can be summarised as 
follows. Fiscal flows in Italy are huge and are mostly driven by the large difference in economic 
development between the different areas of the country, and in particular between the rich North 
and the poor South, although social protection (e.g. the public pension system) also plays an 
important and separate role in determining interregional redistribution. The public sector generally 
works in the direction of equalizing per capita (current) public expenditure across regions, at least 
for fundamental services, although this equalization is far from being complete (and it would 
certainly be much lower if we had considered the quality of public services too). However, the 
distance in economic development, and therefore in tax revenues among regions, is so large that 
even this partial equalization is enough to generate consistent fiscal flows across the national 
territory. With the deepening of the economic crisis and the need of more resources to be invested 
in the North, one may actually wonder if these financial flows are still sustainable by the country. 
Despite the new Constitution, these territorial difference are also so large to put in jeopardy the 
continuation of the decentralization process. Clearly, fiscal federalism has some chances of success 
in Italy only if it works in the direction of reducing the distance between territorial areas, starting 
again that convergence process which stopped more than thirty years ago. One problem is that the 
Italian debate on fiscal federalism is rich in ideology and poor in facts. It would certainly benefit by 
an improved quality of regional data and by official estimations, based on clear and transparent 
methodology, of regional fiscal flows.   
     
 
   28
References  
 
AcoFF - Alta Commissione di Studio per la definizione dei meccanismi strutturali del federalismo 
fiscale, Relazione sull’attività svolta, Roma, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze,  2005  
 
Ahmad E., Brosio (eds) (2006), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Cheltenham and Northampton: 
Edward Elgar.  
 
Ambrosanio M.F., Bordignon, M. (2004) Il Federalismo in pratica; il benchmarking delle Regioni 
Italiane, CIFREL, Milano.  
 
Ambrosanio M.F., Bordignon, M. (2006) Normative versus Positive Theories of Revenue 
Assignments in Federations in Ahmad E., Brosio (eds) Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, 
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.  
 
Ambrosanio M.F., Bordignon, M. (2006) Il federalismo fiscale in Italia: fatti e problemi in Italia 
«Osservatorio Monetario» n.1, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Laboratorio di Analisi 
Monetaria 
 
Ambrosanio M.F., Bordignon, M. (2008) Il federalismo fiscale in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
forthcoming.  
 
Ambrosanio M.F., Bordignon, M., Turati, G. (2008) La stima degli effetti della proposta di legge al 
parlamento n. 0040 approvata dal Consiglio regionale della Lombardia, Milano, Università 
Cattolica, mimeo.  
 
Arachi G., Ferrario, C. and Zanardi A. (2006), Redistribuzione e ripartizione del rischio fra territori 
regionali in Italia: il ruolo dei diversi livelli di governo, in Barca F., Cappiello F., Ravoni L., 
Volpe, M. (eds.), Federalismo, equità, sviluppo, I risultati delle politiche pubbliche analizzati e 
misurati dai Conti pubblici territoriali, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
 
Barca F., Cappiello F., Ravoni L., Volpe, M. (edrs.) (2006), Federalismo, equità, sviluppo, I 
risultati delle politiche pubbliche analizzati e misurati dai Conti pubblici territoriali, Il Mulino, 
Bologna. 
 
Bordignon M. (2000) "Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Relationships: 
The case of Italy", Inter-American Development Bank, working Paper, November 2000 (R-398). 
 
Bordignon M., Cerniglia F. (2001a), L’aritmetica del decentramento: devolution all’italiana e 
problematiche connesse, in Temi di Finanza Pubblica, Verde A. edr., Cacucci Editore, Bari.  
 
Bordignon M., Cerniglia F. (2001b) Riforme costituzionali e decentramento fiscale, «Economia 
Italiana, 3 
 
Bordignon M., Cerniglia F. (2004) I nuovi rapporti finanziari fra Stato ed autonomie locali alla 
luce della riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione, in Rivista di Politica Economica,  n. IX-X,  
settembre-ottobre 2004 
 
Bordignon M., Turati G. ( 2008 )  “Bailing Out Expectations and Health Expenditure in Italy: an 
empirical approach”, (with Gilberto Turati), February 2005 - Revised version 
   29
Brosio, G., Revelli, F. (2003) The political economy of regional opting our: distributive 
implications of a prospective Europe of Regions, in  Economics of Governance, n.4 
 
Dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo (several years), I conti pubblici territoriali 
 
Dreze J. (2003) Regions of Europe: A feasible Status, to be discussed in Economic Policy 
 
Fondazione Agnelli (1994) Una proposta di federalismo fiscale, G. Brosio, G. Pola e D. Bondonio 
eds., Contributi di ricerca, Torino. 
 
Fondazione Agnelli (1998) Il residuo fiscale nelle Regioni italiane: confronto 1989-1995, M. 
Maggi e S. Piperno eds., Contributi di Ricerca, Torino  
 
Giarda P. (2004), Decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations in Italy: a review og past 
and recent trends, in Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze, LXIII, n. 4 
 
Isae (2005)  Rapporto annuale sull’attuazione del federalismo, febbraio 2005  
 
Isae (2006)  Rapporto annuale sull’attuazione del federalismo, marzo 2006   
 
ISTAT, Spesa delle Amministrazioni pubbliche per funzione 1990-2006, 7 febbraio 2008 
 
ISTAT, Conti ed aggregati economici delle AP, 12 giugno 2007 
 
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (several years), Relazione generale sulla situazione 
economica del Paese 
 
Oates W. (1999) An essay on Fiscal Federalism, in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 3 
 
OECD (1999) Taxing powers of state and local government, OECD tax policy studies, No. 1  
 
OECD (2003) Fiscal relations across government levels.  
 
Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (2007), La spesa statale regionalizzata. Anno 2005  
 
Ruggeri J. (2008) Regional fiscal flows: measurement tools, paper prepared for the Symposium on 
Fiscal Federalism organized by IEB, Barcellona, June 2008 
 
Ruggeri J and Yu W. (2000) Federal fiscal balance and redistribution in Canada, 1992-1997, 
«Canadian Tax Journal», vol. 48, n. 3, pp. 392-412.  
 
Senato della Repubblica, Conti  pubblici, contesto di riferimento e andamenti, n.3 May 2008,   
Servizio Bilancio del Senato  




1. L. Giuriato, Problemi di sostenibilità di programmi di riforma strutturale, 
settembre 1993. 
2. L. Giuriato, Mutamenti di regime e riforme: stabilità politica e comportamenti 
accomodanti, settembre 1993. 
3. U. Galmarini, Income Tax Enforcement Policy with Risk Averse Agents, 
novembre 1993. 
4. P. Giarda, Le competenze regionali nelle recenti proposte di riforma 
costituzionale, gennaio 1994. 
5. L. Giuriato, Therapy by Consensus in Systemic Transformations: an Evolutionary 
Perspective, maggio 1994. 
6. M. Bordignon, Federalismo, perequazione e competizione fiscale. Spunti di 
riflessione in merito alle ipotesi di riforma della finanza regionale in Italia, aprile 
1995. 
7. M. F. Ambrosanio, Contenimento del disavanzo pubblico e controllo delle 
retribuzioni nel pubblico impiego, maggio 1995. 
8. M. Bordignon, On Measuring Inefficiency in Economies with Public Goods: an 
Overall Measure of the Deadweight Loss of the Public Sector, luglio 1995. 
9. G. Colangelo, U. Galmarini, On the Pareto Ranking of Commodity Taxes in 
Oligopoly, novembre 1995. 
10. U. Galmarini, Coefficienti presuntivi di reddito e politiche di accertamento 
fiscale, dicembre 1995. 
11. U. Galmarini, On the Size of the Regressive Bias in Tax Enforcement, febbraio 
1996. 
12. G. Mastromatteo, Innovazione di Prodotto e Dimensione del Settore Pubblico 
nel Modello di Baumol, giugno 1996. 
13. G. Turati,  La tassazione delle attività finanziarie in Italia: verifiche empiriche 
in tema di efficienza e di equità, settembre 1996. 
14. G. Mastromatteo,  Economia monetaria post-keynesiana e rigidità dei tassi 
bancari, settembre 1996. 
15. L. Rizzo, Equalization of Public Training Expenditure in a Cross-Border 
Labour Market, maggio 1997. 
16. C. Bisogno, Il mercato del credito e la propensione al risparmio delle famiglie: 
aggiornamento di un lavoro di Jappelli e Pagano, maggio 1997. 
  17. F.G. Etro, Evasione delle imposte indirette in oligopolio. Incidenza e ottima 
tassazione, luglio 1997. 
  18. L. Colombo, Problemi di adozione tecnologica in un’industria monopolistica, 
ottobre 1997. 
  19. L. Rizzo, Local Provision of Training in a Common Labour Market, marzo 
1998. 
20. M.C. Chiuri, A Model for the Household Labour Supply: An Empirical Test On 
A Sample of Italian Household with Pre-School Children, maggio 1998. 
21. U. Galmarini, Tax Avoidance and Progressivity of the Income Tax in an 
Occupational Choice Model, luglio 1998. 
22. R. Hamaui, M. Ratti, The National Central Banks’ Role under EMU. The Case 
of the Bank of Italy, novembre 1998.  
23. A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Heterogeneous Agents, Indexation and the Non 
Neutrality of Money, marzo 1999. 
24. A. Baglioni, Liquidity Risk and Market Power in Banking, luglio 1999. 
25. M. Flavia Ambrosanio, Armonizzazione e concorrenza fiscale: la politica della 
Comunità Europea, luglio 1999. 
26. A. Balestrino, U. Galmarini, Public Expenditure and Tax Avoidance, ottobre 
1999. 
27. L. Colombo, G. Weinrich, The Phillips Curve as a Long-Run Phenomenon in a 
Macroeconomic Model with Complex Dynamics, aprile 2000. 
28. G.P. Barbetta, G. Turati, L’analisi dell’efficienza tecnica nel settore della sanità. 
Un’applicazione al caso della Lombardia, maggio 2000. 
29. L. Colombo, Struttura finanziaria delle imprese, rinegoziazione del debito Vs. 
Liquidazione. Una rassegna della letteratura, maggio 2000. 
30. M. Bordignon, Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental 
Relationships: the Case of Italy, giugno 2000. 
31. A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Strategic complementarity, near-rationality and 
coordination, giugno 2000. 
32. P. Balduzzi, Sistemi pensionistici a ripartizione e a capitalizzazione: il caso 
cileno e le implicazioni per l’Italia, luglio 2000. 
33. A. Baglioni, Multiple Banking Relationships: competition among “inside” 
banks, ottobre 2000. 
34. A. Baglioni, R. Hamaui, The Choice among Alternative Payment Systems: The 
European Experience, ottobre 2000. 
35. M.F. Ambrosanio, M. Bordignon, La concorrenza fiscale in Europa: evidenze, 
dibattito, politiche, novembre 2000. 
36. L. Rizzo, Equalization and Fiscal Competition: Theory and Evidence, maggio 
2001. 
37. L. Rizzo, Le Inefficienze del Decentramento Fiscale, maggio 2001. 
38. L. Colombo, On the Role of Spillover Effects in Technology Adoption Problems, 
maggio 2001. 
39. L. Colombo, G. Coltro, La misurazione della produttività: evidenza empirica e 
problemi metodologici, maggio 2001. 
40. L. Cappellari, G. Turati, Volunteer Labour Supply: The Role of Workers’ 
Motivations, luglio 2001. 
41. G.P. Barbetta, G. Turati, Efficiency of junior high schools and the role of 
proprietary structure, ottobre 2001. 
42. A. Boitani, C. Cambini, Regolazione incentivante per i servizi di trasporto 
locale, novembre 2001. 
43. P. Giarda, Fiscal federalism in the Italian Constitution: the aftermath of the 
October 7
th referendum, novembre 2001. 
44. M. Bordignon, F. Cerniglia, F. Revelli, In Search for Yardstick Competition: 
Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities, marzo 2002. 
45. F. Etro, International Policy Coordination with Economic Unions, marzo 2002. 
46. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, A Puzzle Solved: the Euro is the D.Mark, settembre 
2002. 
47. A. Baglioni, Bank Capital Regulation and Monetary Policy Transmission: an 
heterogeneous agents approach, ottobre 2002. 
48. A. Baglioni, The New Basle Accord: Which Implications for Monetary Policy 
Transmission?, ottobre 2002. 
49. F. Etro, P. Giarda, Redistribution, Decentralization and Constitutional Rules, 
ottobre 2002. 
50. L. Colombo, G. Turati, La Dimensione Territoriale nei Processi di 
Concentrazione dell’Industria Bancaria Italiana, novembre 2002.  
51. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, The Reputation of a newborn Central Bank, marzo 
2003. 
52. M. Bordignon, L. Colombo, U. Galmarini, Fiscal Federalism and Endogenous 
Lobbies’ Formation, ottobre 2003. 
53. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, The Reaction of central banks to Stock Markets, 
novembre 2003. 
54. A. Boitani, C. Cambini, Le gare per i servizi di trasporto locale in Europa e in 
Italia: molto rumore per nulla?, febbraio 2004. 
55. V. Oppedisano, I buoni scuola: un’analisi teorica e un esperimento empirico 
sulla realtà lombarda, aprile 2004. 
56. M. F. Ambrosanio, Il ruolo degli enti locali per lo sviluppo sostenibile: prime 
valutazioni, luglio 2004. 
57. M. F. Ambrosanio, M. S. Caroppo, The Response of Tax Havens to Initiatives 
Against Harmful Tax Competition: Formal Statements and Concrete Policies, 
ottobre 2004. 
58. A. Monticini, G. Vaciago, Are Europe’s Interest Rates led by FED 
Announcements?, dicembre 2004. 
59. A. Prandini, P. Ranci, The Privatisation Process, dicembre 2004. 
60. G. Mastromatteo, L. Ventura, Fundamentals, beliefs, and the origin of money: a 
search theoretic perspective, dicembre 2004. 
61. A. Baglioni, L. Colombo, Managers’ Compensation and Misreporting, dicembre 
2004. 
62. P. Giarda, Decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations in Italy: a 
review of past and recent trends, gennaio 2005. 
63. A. Baglioni, A. Monticini, The Intraday price of money: evidence from the e-
MID market, luglio 2005. 
64. A. Terzi, International Financial Instability in a World of Currencies Hierarchy, 
ottobre 2005. 
65. M. F. Ambrosanio, A. Fontana, Ricognizione delle Fonti Informative sulla 
Finanza Pubblica Italiana, gennaio 2006. 
66. L. Colombo, M. Grillo, Collusion when the Number of Firms is Large, marzo 
2006. 
67. A. Terzi, G. Verga, Stock-bond correlation and the bond quality ratio: Removing 
the discount factor to generate a “deflated” stock index, luglio 2006. 
68. M. Grillo, The Theory and Practice of Antitrust. A perspective in the history of 
economic ideas, settembre 2006. 
69. A. Baglioni, Entry into a network industry: consumers’ expectations and firms’ 
pricing policies, novembre 2006. 
70. Z. Rotondi, G. Vaciago, Lessons from the ECB experience: Frankfurt still 
matters!, marzo 2007. 
71. G. Vaciago, Gli immobili pubblici…..ovvero, purché restino immobili, marzo 
2007. 
72. F. Mattesini, L. Rossi, Productivity shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy in a 
Unionized Labor Market Economy, marzo 2007. 
73. L. Colombo, G. Femminis, The Social Value of Public Information with Costly 
Information Acquisition, marzo 2007. 
74. L. Colombo, H. Dawid, K. Kabus, When do Thick Venture Capital Markets 
Foster Innovation? An Evolutionary Analysis, marzo 2007. 
75. A. Baglioni, Corporate Governance as a Commitment and Signalling Device, 
novembre 2007. 
76. L. Colombo, G. Turati, The Role of the Local Business Environment in Banking 
Consolidation, febbraio 2008.  
77. F. Mattesini, L. Rossi, Optimal Monetary Policy in Economies with Dual Labor 
Markets, febbraio 2008. 
78. M. Abbritti, A. Boitani, M. Damiani, Labour market imperfections, “divine 
coincidence” and the volatility of employment and inflation, marzo 2008. 
79. S. Colombo, Discriminatory prices, endogenous locations and the Prisoner 
Dilemma problem, aprile 2008. 
80. L. Colombo, H. Dawid, Complementary Assets, Start-Ups and Incentives to 
Innovate, aprile 2008. 
81. A. Baglioni, Shareholders’ Agreements and Voting Power, Evidence from 
Italian Listed Firms, maggio 2008. 
82. G. Ascari, L. Rossi, Long-run Phillips Curve and Disinflation Dynamics: Calvo 
vs. Rotemberg Price Setting, settembre 2008. 
83. A. Baglioni, A. Monticini, The intraday interest rate under a liquidity crisis: the 
case of August 2007, ottobre 2008. 
84. M. F. Ambrosanio, M. Bordignon, F. Cerniglia, Constitutional reforms, fiscal 
decentralization and regional fiscal flows in Italy, dicembre 2008. 
 